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Abstract
This paper is the second in a series whose goal is to develop a fundamentally
new way of constructing theories of physics. The motivation comes from a desire
to address certain deep issues that arise when contemplating quantum theories
of space and time.
Our basic contention is that constructing a theory of physics is equivalent to
finding a representation in a topos of a certain formal language that is attached
to the system. Classical physics arises when the topos is the category of sets.
Other types of theory employ a different topos.
In this paper, we study in depth the topos representation of the propositional
language, PL(S), for the case of quantum theory. In doing so, we make a direct
link with, and clarify, the earlier work on applying topos theory to quantum
physics. The key step is a process we term ‘daseinisation’ by which a projection
operator is mapped to a sub-object of the spectral presheaf—the topos quantum
analogue of a classical state space.
In the second part of the paper we change gear with the introduction of the
more sophisticated local language L(S). From this point forward, throughout
the rest of the series of papers, our attention will be devoted almost entirely to
this language. In the present paper, we use L(S) to study ‘truth objects’ in the
topos. These are objects in the topos that play the role of states: a necessary
development as the spectral presheaf has no global elements, and hence there are
no microstates in the sense of classical physics. Truth objects therefore play a
crucial role in our formalism.
1email: a.doering@imperial.ac.uk
2email: c.isham@imperial.ac.uk
1 Introduction
This is the second in a series of papers whose aim is to formulate a general framework
for expressing theories of physics in a topos other than that of sets. In paper I we
introduced the idea that a formal language can be attached to each system, S, and
that, in the broadest sense, constructing a physical theory of S is equivalent to finding
a representation, φ, of this language in a topos τφ [1].
It is expected that, for a given system, different theory-types (such as classical
physics, quantum physics, and others yet to be discovered) will be represented in
different topoi. Typically, more than one system will share the same language, and,
for a given theory-type, these systems will generally be represented in the same topos.
However, the details of the representation will be system dependent.
For example, let the system, S, be a non-relativistic point particle moving in three
dimensions with the Hamiltonian H = p · p/2m2 + V (x). The application of the
theory-type “classical physics” involves a representation in the topos, Sets, of sets,
and different representations of the language of S correspond to different choices of the
potential V (x). On the other hand, a representation of the same system, but for the
theory-type “quantum physics”, employs a topos of presheaves, SetsC
op
, over a certain
category C (see below) that depends on the system. Once again, different Hamiltonians
correspond to different representations in this topos.
In the first paper, I, we discussed two different types of language that can be
attached to a system S. The first is a simple propositional language, PL(S), that is
generated by primitive propositions of the form “Aε∆”. Such a proposition is to be
understood in a realist fashion as asserting “The physical quantity A has a value that
lies in the (Borel) subset ∆ of IR”. The language PL(S) has the logical connectives
∧,∨,¬,⇒; but nothing else. In particular, it does not include the quantifiers ∀ and ∃.
Nevertheless, it does enable compound propositions about the world to be asserted. It
also has a deductive structure that follows from a set of axioms that ensure the validity
of intuitionistic logic. The choice of intuitionistic logic over against Boolean logic is
made with the hindsight of knowing that each topos has an internal logic of this type.
This propositional language is used in the first half of the present paper where we
explore in detail the representation of propositions by (clopen) sub-objects of the state
object (the significance of the word ‘clopen’ is explained below). However, for the sake
of overall clarity it should be emphasised that the work involving PL(S) is a something
of a side-line to our main programme, which is concerned with the local language L(S).
In fact, logically speaking, the reader could jump straight to Section 4, which deals
with the idea of a ‘truth object’ in the context of the language L(S). However, we
decided to include the PL(S)-material because it is what links most closely to the
original work on using topos ideas in quantum theory. Indeed, as we shall see, the
new material on the representation of PL(S) includes a vital concept that was not
understood before, and which places the earlier work in a much clearer light.
The second language introduced in paper I is far more powerful. Firstly, it is higher
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order, so that the existential connectives ∀, ∃ are included. Secondly, this, so-called,
‘local’ language, L(S), is typed : a feature that allows the most important ingredients
of any theory of physics to be included in a very specific way.
Specifically, L(S) contains the ‘ground-type symbols’, Σ andR, which are construed
as the ‘linguistic precursors’ of the state object, and quantity-value object, respectively.
Thus, in any representation3, φ, of L(S) in a topos τφ, the symbols Σ and R are
mapped to objects Σφ and Rφ in τφ which are the state object and quantity-value
object, respectively, for this particular theory.
The application of this structure to classical physics was discussed in I, and in the
present paper, we want to turn to the, more challenging, case of quantum theory. We
know from the earlier work on applying topos ideas to quantum theory, that the topos
of the quantum representation, φ, of L(S) is the category of presheaves, SetsV(H)
op
, over
the category V(H) of unital, abelian von Neumann subalgebras of B(H). Here, B(H) is
the non-commutative algebra of all bounded operators on the Hilbert space, H, of the
quantum system. In this representation, the state object, Σφ, is the spectral presheaf
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Σ that was discussed at length in the earlier work [13, 14, 15, 16]; see Definition 2.3 in
this paper. This is the quantum analogue of the classical state space.
Still, it remains true that only a limited range of questions can be addressed using
the propositional language, PL(S), and to appreciate properly the full scope of the
‘toposification’ ideas it is essential to employ the more sophisticated local language
L(S). For this reason, in the second part of the paper we switch to using L(S), and
this will be the focus of our attention for the remaining papers in this series.
Amongst other things, using L(S) involves identifying the quantity-value presheaf:
something that is not part of the simpler language PL(S). The quantity-value presheaf,
Rφ, and related topics are discussed in papers III and IV [2, 3]. In particular, in paper
III we show how a function symbol A : Σ → R (i.e., a physical quantity) can be
represented by an arrow Aφ : Σφ →Rφ, where Σφ is the spectral presheaf Σ.
Returning to PL(S), the plan of the present paper is as follows. A key step in
constructing a topos representation is an operation that we call ‘daseinisation’, and
this is discussed in detail in Section 2. This involves constructing a map from the
lattice of projectors P(H) to the Heyting algebra Subcl(Σ) of clopen sub-objects of the
spectral presheaf Σ. The motivation for this construction lies in the earlier work on
topos theory and quantum mechanics [13, 14, 15, 16] but the key technical ingredient
is due to de Groote [10].
One feature of this construction is that there are more clopen sub-objects of Σ
than those given by daseinisation of projection operators. This raises the question of
3A more comprehensive notation is τφ(S), which draws attention to the system S under discussion;
similarly, the state object could be written as Σφ,S , and so on. This extended notation is used in
paper IV where we are concerned with the relations between different systems, and then it is essential
to indicate which system is meant. However, in the present paper, only one system at a time is being
considered, and so the truncated notation is adequate.
4As a pedagogical aid, all presheaves will be denoted with an underlined symbol, like Σ, R, Ω etc.
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whether there are special, definitive features of the sub-objects that are of the form
δ(Pˆ ), Pˆ ∈ P(H), and this is discussed in detail in Section 3 where we show that the
daseinised propositions are ‘optimal’ in the lattice of all sub-objects of Σ.
The state object, Σ, in the quantum topos has no global elements (this statement
is equivalent to the Kochen-Specker theorem) and, therefore, the assignation of ‘truth
values’ to propositions needs an approach that is structurally different from the one
used in classical physics. This issue is discussed in detail in Section 4, using a method
that rests heavily on the local language L(S). In particular, we introduce into L(S)
a variable that is the linguistic precursor of the truth object needed in the topos
representations. We then use this to motivate an analogous construction in quantum
theory for the propositional language PL(S). The same kind of truth object is used
in the context of a representation of the local language L(S) in quantum theory, see
paper III.
A cautionary caveat. At this point, before embarking on the main text, we want
to remark on the scope of the work reported in this paper, and in paper III: i.e.,
the application of topos ideas to standard quantum theory via the representation of a
system language.
For the language PL(S), a key result from the topos constructions is that, given any
quantum state |ψ〉, there are generalised truth values, ν
(
Aε∆; |ψ〉
)
, for propositions
“Aε∆”. These truth values belong to the Heyting algebra, ΓΩφ, of global elements
of the sub-object classifier, Ωφ, of the topos concerned. In making these assignments,
nothing is said about ‘measurements’, or ‘observers’, or even ‘probability’: there is just
the truth value ν
(
Aε∆; |ψ〉
)
∈ ΓΩφ.
It is this absence of instrumentalist concepts that motivates/justifies the appellation
‘neo-realist’ for this topos approach to quantum theory. However, we want to insert
a cautionary remark. Our specific topos constructions for quantum theory are based
on the usual mathematical formalism of self-adjoint operators on a Hilbert space; and
some physicists, such as Bohr, have asserted that this formalism is fundamentally
associated with an instrumentalist interpretation of the theory, whose predictions are
probabilities of the results of making measurements. If this is true, our neo-realism
would sit uncomfortably on the formalism.
On the other hand, maybe our quantum results are meaningful as they stand—
particularly the ones obtained using the local language L(S) (in paper III). If so, an
intriguing challenge would be to use these methods to construct a neo-realist perspec-
tive on a quantum-cosmological model. A particularly appropriate example is the re-
cent construction by Kessari of a (HPO5) consistent-histories version of the Robertson-
Walker universe [4].
Evidently, the operation we have called ‘daseinisation’ is a bridge between the
5There are various mathematical approaches to formulating consistent-histories quantum theory,
but the one to which our topos work could most easily be adapted is the ‘History Projection Operator’
(HPO) scheme in which history propositions are represented by projection operators.
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intrinsic instrumentalism of the standard quantum formalism, and a full neo-realism
associated with the language L(S) which makes no reference to entities outside that
language. In this sense, standard quantum theory is a ‘hybrid’ object that interpolates
between the instrumentalist world, with its various background structures, and the
neo-realist world, in which almost everything has a linguistic precursor.
However, as we keep emphasising, our main goal is to construct tools for developing
new types of theory, not just to look at standard quantum theory from a novel angle.
For us, the most important thing about the topos approach to standard quantum theory
is that (we hope) it serves as a paradigmatic example of the types of mathematical
structure that might be needed to develop theories that go ‘beyond’ standard quantum
theory, and that are not slaves to the use of continuum entities. We will have more to
say about this central theme at various points in this series of papers.
2 Quantum Propositions as Sub-Objects of the Spec-
tral Presheaf
2.1 From Projections to Global Sections of the Outer Presheaf
2.1.1 The Definition of δ(Pˆ )V
The fundamental thesis of our work is that, in constructing theories of physics, one
should seek representations of a formal language in a topos that may be other than
Sets. We want now to study this idea closely in the context of the toposification
of standard quantum theory, with particular emphasis on a topos representation of
propositions. Most ‘standard’ quantum systems (for example, one-dimensional motion
with a Hamiltonian H = p
2
2m
+ V (x)) are obtained by ‘quantising’ a classical system,
and consequently the language is the same as it is for the classical system.
As explained in the Introduction, in the first half of this paper we concentrate
on the propositional language PL(S), so that the critical task is to find the map
piqt : PL(S)0 → Subcl(Σ), where the primitive propositions in PL(S)0 are of the form
“Aε∆” (the notation is explained in paper I [1]). As we shall see, this is where the
critical concept of daseinisation arises: the procedure whereby a projector Pˆ is trans-
formed to a (clopen) sub-object, δ(Pˆ ), of the spectral presheaf in the topos SetsV(H)
op
.
In standard quantum theory, a physical quantity is represented by a self-adjoint
operator Aˆ in the algebra, B(H), of all bounded operators on H. If ∆ ⊆ IR is a Borel
subset, we know from the spectral theorem that the proposition “Aε∆” is represented
by6 a projection operator Eˆ[A ∈ ∆] in B(H). For typographical simplicity, for the rest
of this Section, Eˆ[A ∈ ∆] will be denoted by Pˆ .
6Note, however, that the map from propositions to projections is not injective: two propositions
“Aε∆1” and “Bε∆2” about two distinct physical quantities, A and B, can be represented by the
same projector: i.e., Eˆ[A ∈ ∆1] = Eˆ[B ∈ ∆2].
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We are going to consider the projection operator Pˆ from the perspective of the
‘category of contexts’ that is the basis of the topos approach to quantum theory. There
are several possible choices for this category, and these are considered in detail in the
original papers [13, 14, 15, 16]. Mathematically, they are ultimately all equivalent, but
here we have chosen to use the category V(H) of unital, abelian subalgebras of B(H).
The category structure is that of a partially-ordered set whose objects are the abelian
subalgebras, and in which there is an arrow iV ′V : V
′ → V , V ′, V ∈ Ob(V(H)),7 if and
only if V ′ ⊆ V . By definition, the trivial subalgebra V0 = |C1ˆ is not included in the
objects of V(H). A context could also be called a ‘world-view’, or a ‘window on the
world’, or even a Weltanschauung8; mathematicians call it a ‘stage of truth’.
The critical question is what can be said about the projector Pˆ ‘from the view-
point’ of a particular context V ∈ Ob(V(H))? If Pˆ belongs to V then a ‘full’ image of
Pˆ is obtained from this view-point, and there is nothing more to say. However, suppose
the abelian subalgebra V does not contain Pˆ : what then?
We need to ‘approximate’ Pˆ from the perspective of V , and an important ingredient
in our work is to define this as meaning the ‘smallest’ projection operator, δ(Pˆ )V , in
V that is greater than, or equal to, Pˆ :
δ(Pˆ )V :=
∧{
Qˆ ∈ P(V ) | Qˆ  Pˆ
}
. (2.1)
where ‘’ is the usual ‘quantum-logic’ ordering of projection operators, and where
P(V ) denotes the set of all projection operators in V .
To see what this means, let Pˆ and Qˆ represent the propositions “Aε∆” and “Aε∆′”
respectively with ∆ ⊆ ∆′, so that Pˆ  Qˆ. Since we learn less about the value of A
from the proposition “Aε∆′” than from “Aε∆”, the former proposition is said to be
weaker. Clearly, the weaker proposition “Aε∆′” is implied by the stronger proposition
“Aε∆”. The construction of δ(Pˆ )V as the smallest projection in V greater than or
equal to Pˆ thus gives the strongest proposition expressible in V that is implied by Pˆ
(although, if Aˆ /∈ V , the projection δ(Pˆ )V cannot be interpreted as a proposition about
A in general).9 Note that if Pˆ belongs to V , then δ(Pˆ )V = Pˆ . The mapping Pˆ 7→ δ(Pˆ )V
was originally introduced by de Groote in [10], who called it the ‘V -support’ of Pˆ .
The key idea in this part of our scheme is that rather than thinking of a quantum
proposition, “Aε∆”, as being represented by a single projection operator Eˆ[A ∈ ∆],
we instead consider the collection {δ
(
Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]
)
V
| V ∈ Ob(V(H))} of one projection
operator for each context V . As we will see, the link with topos theory is that this
collection of projectors is a global element of a certain presheaf.
This ‘certain’ presheaf is in fact the ‘outer’ presheaf, which is defined as follows:
7We denote by Ob(C) the collection of all objects in the category C.
8‘Weltanschauung’ is a splendid German word. ‘Welt’ means world; ‘schauen’ is a verb and means
to look, to view; ‘anschauen’ is to look at; and ‘-ung’ at the end of a word can make a noun from a
verb. So it’s Welt-an-schau-ung.
9Note that we use the fact that the lattice P(V ) of projections in V is complete. This is the main
reason why we chose von Neumann subalgebras rather than C∗-algebras: the former contain enough
projections, and their projection lattices are complete.
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Definition 2.1 The outer10 presheaf O is defined over the category V(H) as follows
[13, 15]:
(i) On objects V ∈ Ob(V(H)): OV := P(V )
(ii) On morphisms iV ′V : V
′ ⊆ V : The mapping O(iV ′V ) : OV → OV ′ is given by
O(iV ′V )(αˆ) := δ(αˆ)V ′ for all αˆ ∈ P(V ).
With this definition, it is clear that the assignment V 7→ δ(Pˆ )V defines a global
element of the presheaf O. Indeed, for each context V , we have the projector δ(Pˆ )V ∈
P(V ) = OV , and if iV ′V : V
′ ⊆ V , then
δ
(
δ(Pˆ )V
)
V ′
=
∧{
Qˆ ∈ P(V ′) | Qˆ  δ(Pˆ )V
}
= δ(Pˆ )V ′ (2.2)
and so the elements δ(Pˆ )V , V ∈ Ob(V(H)), are compatible with the structure of the
outer presheaf. Thus we have a mapping
δ : P(H) → ΓO
Pˆ 7→ {δ(Pˆ )V | V ∈ Ob(V(H))} (2.3)
from the projectors in P(H) to the global elements, ΓO, of the outer presheaf.11
2.1.2 Properties of the Mapping δ : P(H)→ ΓO.
Let us now note some properties of the map δ : P(H) → ΓO that are relevant to our
overall scheme.
1. For all contexts V , we have δ(0ˆ)V = 0ˆ, i.e., the null projector 0ˆ is mapped to the
null element of O.
The null projector represents all propositions of the form “Aε∆” with the prop-
erty that sp(Aˆ) ∩ ∆ = ∅, where sp(Aˆ) denotes the spectrum of the self-adjoint
operator Aˆ. These propositions are trivially false.
2. For all contexts V , we have δ(1ˆ)V = 1ˆ, i.e., the unit operator 1ˆ is mapped to the
‘unit’ element of O.
The unit operator 1ˆ represents all propositions of the form “Aε∆” with the
property that sp(Aˆ) ∩∆ = sp(Aˆ). These propositions are trivially true.
10In the original papers by CJI and collaborators, this was called the ‘coarse-graining’ presheaf, and
was denoted G. The reason for the change of nomenclature will become apparent later.
11Vis-a-vis our later work with the language L(S), we should emphasise that the outer presheaf
has no linguistic precursor: in this sense, it has no fundamental status. In fact, we could avoid
it altogether and always work directly with the spectral presheaf, Σ—which, of course, does have a
linguistic precursor. However, it is technically useful to introduce the outer presheaf as an intermediate
tool.
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3. There are global elements of O that do not come from a projection operator.
This will be discussed later.
However, if γ ∈ O is of the form δ(Pˆ ) for some Pˆ , then
Pˆ =
∧
V ∈Ob(V(H))
δ(Pˆ )V , (2.4)
because δ(Pˆ )V  Pˆ for all V ∈ Ob(V(H)), and δ(Pˆ )V = Pˆ for any V that
contains Pˆ .
The next result is important as it means that no ‘information’ is lost in mapping a
projection operator Pˆ to its associated global element, δ(Pˆ ), of the presheaf O.
Theorem 2.1 The map δ : P(H)→ ΓO is injective.
To see this, let Pˆ1, Pˆ2 be two different projection operators in P(H). Without loss
of generality, let Pˆ1 6= 1ˆ. Let V1 := {Pˆ1, 1ˆ}
′′ denote the abelian von Neumann algebra
generated by Pˆ1 and 1ˆ. Then P(V1) = {0ˆ, Pˆ1, 1ˆ − Pˆ1, 1ˆ}. We now run through the
possible relations between Pˆ1 and Pˆ2, case by case.
Case (i): Pˆ1 ≺ Pˆ2. (Of course, this includes the case Pˆ2 ≺ Pˆ1 by simple relabelling.)
In this case, δ(Pˆ1)V1 =
∧
{Qˆ ∈ P(V1) | Qˆ  Pˆ1} = Pˆ1 and δ(Pˆ2)V1 = 1ˆ 6= Pˆ1.
Case (ii): 1ˆ− Pˆ1 ≺ Pˆ2. Then δ(Pˆ1)V1 = Pˆ1 and
δ(Pˆ2)V1 =
∧{
Qˆ ∈ P(V1) | Qˆ  Pˆ2
}

∧{
Qˆ ∈ P(V1) | Qˆ  1ˆ− Pˆ1
}
= 1ˆ− Pˆ1. (2.5)
Case (iii): Pˆ1 = 1ˆ− Pˆ2. Then δ(Pˆ1)V1 = Pˆ1 and δ(Pˆ2)V1 = 1ˆ− Pˆ1.
Case (iv): Pˆ1 6≺ Pˆ2 and 1ˆ− Pˆ1 6≺ Pˆ2. In this case, δ(Pˆ1)V1 = Pˆ1 and
δ(Pˆ2)V1 =
∧{
Qˆ ∈ P(V1) | Qˆ  Pˆ2
}
= 1ˆ. (2.6)
In each case, δ(Pˆ1)V1 = Pˆ1 6= δ(Pˆ2)V1 , and hence the global elements δ(Pˆ1) =
{δ(Pˆ1)V | V ∈ Ob(V(H))} and δ(Pˆ2) = {δ(Pˆ2)V | V ∈ Ob(V(H))} differ.
2.1.3 A Logical Structure for ΓO?
We have seen that the quantities δ(Pˆ ) := {δ(Pˆ )V | V ∈ Ob(V(H))}, Pˆ ∈ P(H),
are elements of ΓO, and if they are to represent quantum propositions, one might
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expect/hope that (i) these global elements of O form a Heyting algebra; and (ii) this
algebra is related in some way to the Heyting algebra of sub-objects of Σ. Let us see
how far we can go in this direction.
Our first remark is that any two global elements γ1, γ2 of O can be compared at
each stage V in the sense of logical implication. More precisely, let γ1(V ) ∈ P(V )
denote the V ’th ‘component’ of γ1, and ditto for γ2(V ). Then we have the following
result:
Definition 2.2 A partial ordering on ΓO can be constructed in a ‘local’ way (i.e.,
‘local’ with respect to the objects in the category V(H)) by defining
γ1  γ2 if, and only if, ∀V ∈ Ob(V(H)), γ1(V )  γ2(V ) (2.7)
where the ordering on the right hand side of (2.7) is the usual ordering in the lattice
of projectors P(V ).
It is trivial to check that (2.7) defines a partial ordering on ΓO. Thus ΓO is a partially
ordered set.
Note that if Pˆ , Qˆ are projection operators, then it follows from (2.7) that
δ(Pˆ )  δ(Qˆ) if and only if Pˆ  Qˆ (2.8)
since Pˆ  Qˆ implies δ(Pˆ )V ≥ δ(Qˆ)V for all contexts V .
12 Thus the mapping δ :
P(H)→ ΓO preserves the partial order.
The next thing is to see if a logical ‘∨’-operation can be defined on ΓO. Once again,
we try a ‘local’ definition:
Theorem 2.2 A ‘∨’-structure on ΓO can be defined locally by
(γ1 ∨ γ2)(V ) := γ1(V ) ∨ γ2(V ) (2.9)
for all γ1, γ2 ∈ ΓO, and for all V ∈ Ob(V(H)).
Proof. It is not instantly clear that (2.9) defines a global element of O. However, a
key result in this direction is the following:
Lemma 2.3 For each context V , and for all αˆ, βˆ ∈ P(V ), we have
O(iV ′V )(αˆ ∨ βˆ) = O(iV ′V )(αˆ) ∨O(iV ′V )(βˆ) (2.10)
for all contexts V ′ such that V ′ ⊆ V .
The proof is a straightforward consequence of the definition of the presheaf O.
12On the other hand, in general, Pˆ ≻ Qˆ does not imply δ(Pˆ )V ≻ δ(Qˆ)V but only δ(Pˆ )V  δ(Qˆ)V .
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One immediate consequence is that (2.9) defines a global element13 of O. Hence
the theorem is proved.
It is also straightforward to show that, for any pair of projectors Pˆ , Qˆ ∈ P(H), we
have δ(Pˆ ∨ Qˆ)V = δ(Pˆ )V ∨ δ(Qˆ)V , for all contexts V ∈ Ob(V(H)). This means that,
as elements of ΓO,
δ(Pˆ ∨ Qˆ) = δ(Pˆ ) ∨ δ(Qˆ). (2.11)
Thus the mapping δ : P(H)→ ΓO preserves the logical ‘∨’ operation.
However, there is no analogous equation for the logical ‘∧’-operation. The obvious
local definition would be, for each context V ,
(γ1 ∧ γ2)(V ) := γ1(V ) ∧ γ2(V ) (2.12)
but this does not define a global element of O since, unlike (2.10), for the ∧-operation
we have only
O(iV ′V )(αˆ ∧ βˆ)  O(iV ′V )(αˆ) ∧ O(iV ′V )(βˆ) (2.13)
for all V ′ ⊆ V . As a consequence, for all V , we have only the inequality
δ(Pˆ ∧ Qˆ)V  δ(Pˆ )V ∧ δ(Qˆ)V (2.14)
and hence
δ(Pˆ ∧ Qˆ)  δ(Pˆ ) ∧ δ(Qˆ). (2.15)
It is easy to find examples where the inequality is strict. For example, let Pˆ 6= 0ˆ, 1ˆ
and Qˆ = 1ˆ− Pˆ . Then Pˆ ∧ Qˆ = 0 and hence δV (Pˆ ∧ Qˆ) = 0ˆ, while δ(Pˆ )V ∧ δ(Qˆ)V can
be strictly larger than 0ˆ, since δ(Pˆ )V  Pˆ and δ(Qˆ)V  Qˆ.
2.1.4 Hyper-Elements of ΓO.
We have seen that the global elements of O, i.e., the elements of ΓO, can be equipped
with a partial-ordering and a ‘∨’-operation, but attempts to define a ‘∧’-operation in
the same way fail because of the inequality in (2.14).
However, the form of (2.13–2.14) suggests the following procedure. Let us define a
hyper-element of O to be an association, for each stage V ∈ Ob(V(H)), of an element
γ(V ) ∈ OV with the property that
γ(V ′)  O(iV ′V )(γ(V )) (2.16)
for all V ′ ⊆ V . Clearly every element of ΓO is a hyper-element, but not conversely.
13The existence of the ∨-operation on ΓO can be extended to O itself. More precisely, there is
an arrow ∨ : O × O → O where O × O denotes the product presheaf over V(H), whose objects are
(O×O)V := OV ×OV . Then the arrow ∨ : O×O→ O is defined at any context V by ∨V (αˆ, βˆ) := αˆ∨βˆ
for all αˆ, βˆ ∈ OV .
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Now, if γ1 and γ2 are hyper-elements, we can define the operations ‘∨’ and ‘∧’
locally as:
(γ1 ∨ γ2)(V ) := γ1(V ) ∨ γ2(V ) (2.17)
(γ1 ∧ γ2)(V ) := γ1(V ) ∧ γ2(V ) (2.18)
Because of (2.13) we have, for all V ′ ⊆ V ,
O(iV ′V )
(
(γ1 ∧ γ2)(V )
)
= O(iV ′V )
(
γ1(V ) ∧ γ2(V )
)
(2.19)
 O(iV ′V )(γ1(V )) ∧ O(iV ′V )(γ2(V )) (2.20)
 γ1(V
′) ∧ γ2(V
′) (2.21)
= (γ1 ∧ γ2)(V
′) (2.22)
so that the hyper-element condition (2.16) is preserved.
The occurrence of a logical ‘∨’ and ∧’ structure is encouraging, but it is not yet
what we want. For one thing, there is no mention of a negation operation; and, anyway,
this is not the expected algebra of sub-objects of a ‘state space’ object. To proceed
further we must study more carefully the sub-objects of the spectral presheaf.
2.2 Daseinisation
2.2.1 From Global Sections of O to Sub-Objects of Σ.
The spectral presheaf, Σ, played a central role in the earlier discussions of quantum
theory from a topos perspective [13, 14, 15, 16].
Definition 2.3 The spectral presheaf, Σ, is defined as the following functor from
V(H)op to Sets:
1. On objects V : ΣV is the Gel’fand spectrum of the unital, abelian subalgebra V
of B(H); i.e., the set of all multiplicative linear functionals λ : V → |C such that
λ(1ˆ) = 1.
2. On morphisms iV ′V : V
′ ⊆ V : Σ(iV ′V ) : ΣV → ΣV ′ is defined by Σ(iV ′V )(λ) :=
λ|V ′; i.e., the restriction of the functional λ : V → |C to the subalgebra V
′ ⊆ V .
One important result of spectral theory is that ΣV has a topology that is compact
and Hausdorff, and with respect to which the functionals are continuous. This will be
important in what follows [7].
The spectral presheaf plays a fundamental role in our research programme as applied
to quantum theory. For example, it was shown in the earlier work that the Kochen-
Specker theorem [9] is equivalent to the statement that Σ has no global elements.
However, Σ does have sub-objects, and these are central to our scheme:
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Definition 2.4 A sub-object S of the spectral presheaf Σ is a functor S : V(H)op →
Sets such that
1. SV is a subset of ΣV for all V .
2. If V ′ ⊆ V , then S(iV ′V ) : SV → SV ′ is just the restriction λ 7→ λ|V ′ (i.e., the
same as for Σ), applied to the elements λ ∈ SV ⊆ ΣV .
This definition of a sub-object is standard. However, for our purposes we need
something slightly different, namely a ‘clopen’ sub-object. This is defined to be a sub-
object S of Σ such that, for all V , the set SV is a clopen
14 subset of the compact,
Hausdorff space ΣV . We denote by Subcl(Σ) the set of all clopen sub-objects of Σ. We
will show later that, like Sub(Σ), the set Subcl(Σ) is a Heyting algebra.
This interest in clopen sets is easy to explain. For, according to the Gel’fand
spectral theory, a projection operator αˆ ∈ P(V ) corresponds to a unique clopen subset
of the Gelfand spectrum, ΣV . Furthermore, the Gelfand transform α : ΣV → |C of αˆ
takes the values 0, 1 only, since the spectrum of a projection operator is just {0, 1}.
It follows that α is the characteristic function of the subset, Sαˆ, of ΣV , defined by
Sαˆ := {λ ∈ ΣV | λ(αˆ) = 1}. (2.23)
The clopen nature of Sαˆ follows from the fact that, by the spectral theory, the function
α : ΣV → {0, 1} is continuous.
In fact, there is a lattice isomorphism between the lattice P(V ) of projectors in V
and the lattice CL(ΣV ) of clopen subsets of ΣV ,
15 given by
αˆ 7→ Sαˆ := {λ ∈ ΣV | λ(αˆ) = 1}. (2.24)
Conversely, given a clopen subset S ∈ CL(ΣV ), we get the corresponding projection
αˆ as the (inverse Gelfand transform of the) characteristic function of S. Hence, each
S ∈ CL(ΣV ) is of the form S = Sαˆ for some αˆ ∈ P(V ).
Our claim is the following:
Theorem 2.4 For each projection operator Pˆ ∈ P(H), the collection of subsets
SPˆ := {Sδ(Pˆ )V ⊆ ΣV | V ∈ Ob(V(H))} (2.25)
forms a (clopen) sub-object of the spectral presheaf Σ.
Proof. To see this, let λ ∈ Sδ(Pˆ )V . Then if V
′ is some abelian subalgebra of V , we
have δ(Pˆ )V ′ =
∧{
Qˆ ∈ P(V ′) | Qˆ  δ(Pˆ )V
}
 δ(Pˆ )V . Now let Qˆ := δ(Pˆ )V ′ − δ(Pˆ )V .
14A ‘clopen’ subset of a topological space is one that is both open and closed.
15 The lattice structure on CL(ΣV ) is defined as follows: if (Ui)i∈I is an arbitrary family of clopen
subsets of ΣV , then
⋃
i∈I Ui is the maximum, and the interior of
⋂
i∈I Ui is the minimum of the family.
One must take the interior since
⋂
i∈I Ui is closed, but not necessarily open.
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Then λ
(
δ(Pˆ )V ′
)
= λ
(
δ(Pˆ )V
)
+ λ(Qˆ) = 1, since λ
(
δ(Pˆ )V
)
= 1 and λ(Qˆ) ∈ {0, 1}. This
shows that
{λ|V ′ | λ ∈ Sδ(Pˆ )V } ⊆ Sδ(Pˆ )V ′ . (2.26)
However, the left hand side of (2.26) is the subset O(iV ′V )(Sδ(Pˆ )V ) ⊆ ΣV ′ of the outer-
presheaf restriction of elements in Sδ(Pˆ )V to ΣV ′ , and the restricted elements all lie in
Sδ(Pˆ )V ′ . It follows that the collection of sets
SPˆ := {Sδ(Pˆ )V ⊆ ΣV | V ∈ Ob(V(H))} (2.27)
forms a (clopen) sub-object of the spectral presheaf Σ.
By these means we have constructed a mapping
δ : P(H) −→ Subcl(Σ)
Pˆ 7→ SPˆ := {Sδ(Pˆ )V | V ∈ Ob(V(H))} (2.28)
which sends projection operators on H to clopen sub-objects of Σ.
2.2.2 Heidegger encounters physics
As usual, the projection Pˆ is regarded as representing a proposition about the quantum
system. Thus δ maps propositions about a quantum system to (clopen) sub-objects
of the spectral presheaf. This is remarkably analogous to the situation in classical
physics, in which propositions are represented by subsets of the classical state space.
Definition 2.5 The map δ in (2.28) is a fundamental part of our construction. We
call it the daseinisation16 of Pˆ . We shall use the same word to refer to the operation
in eq. 2.1 that relates to the outer presheaf.
We will summarise here some useful properties of daseinisation.
1. The null projection 0ˆ is mapped to the empty sub-object, δ(0ˆ) = {∅V | V ∈
Ob(V(H))}, of Σ.
2. The identity projection 1ˆ is mapped to the unit sub-object, δ(1ˆ) = {ΣV | V ∈
Ob(V(H))} = Σ of Σ.
3. Since the daseinisation map δ : P(H) → ΓO is injective (see Section 2.1.2),
and the mapping ΓO → Γ(PclΣ) is injective (because there is a monic arrow
O → PclΣ in Sets
V(H)op ; see Section 4.3.2), it follows that the daseinisation map
δ : P(H) → Γ(PclΣ) ≃ Subcl(Σ) is injective. Thus no information about the
projector Pˆ is lost when it is daseinised to become δ(Pˆ ).
16The expression ‘daseinisation’ comes from the German word Dasein, which plays a central role in
Heidegger’s existential philosophy. Dasein translates to ‘existence’ or, in the very literal sense often
stressed by Heidegger, to being-there-in-the-world (the hyphens are very important). Thus daseini-
sation ‘brings-a-quantum-proposition-into-existence’ (the hyphens are very important) by hurling it
into the classical snap-shots of the world provided by the category of contexts.
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2.3 The Heyting Algebra Structure on Subcl(Σ)
The reason for daseinising projections is that the set, Sub(Σ), of sub-objects of the spec-
tral presheaf forms a Heyting algebra. Thus the idea is to find a map piqt : PL(S)0 →
Sub(Σ) and then extend it to all of PL(S) using the simple recursion ideas discussed
in paper I [1].
In our case, the act of daseinisation gives a map from the projection operators to
the clopen sub-objects of Sub(Σ), and therefore a map piqt : PL(S)0 → Subcl(Σ) can
be defined by
piqt(Aε∆) := δ
(
Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]
)
(2.29)
However, to extend this definition to PL(S), it is necessary to show that the set of
clopen sub-objects, Subcl(Σ), is a Heyting algebra. This is not completely obvious from
the definition alone.
Theorem 2.5 The collection, Subcl(Σ), of all clopen sub-objects of Σ is a Heyting
algebra.
Proof. First recall how a Heyting algebra structure is placed on the set, Sub(Σ), of
all sub-objects of Σ.
The ‘∨’- and ‘∧’-operations. Let S, T be two sub-objects of Σ. Then the ‘∨’ and
‘∧’ operations are defined by
(S ∨ T )V := SV ∪ T V (2.30)
(S ∧ T )V := SV ∩ T V (2.31)
for all contexts V . It is easy to see that if S and T are clopen sub-objects of Σ, then
so are S ∨ T and S ∧ T .
The zero and unit elements. The zero element in the Heyting algebra Sub(Σ)
is the empty sub-object 0 := {∅V | V ∈ Ob(V(H))}, where ∅V is the empty subset
of ΣV . The unit element in Sub(Σ) is Σ. It is clear that both 0 and Σ are clopen
sub-objects of Σ.
The ‘⇒’-operation. The most interesting part is the definition of the implication
S ⇒ T . For all V ∈ Ob(V(H)), it is given by
(S ⇒ T )V := {λ ∈ ΣV | ∀V
′ ⊆ V, if
Σ(iV ′V )(λ) ∈ SV ′ then Σ(iV ′V )(λ) ∈ T V ′} (2.32)
= {λ ∈ ΣV | ∀V
′ ⊆ V, if
λ|V ′ ∈ SV ′ then λ|V ′ ∈ T V ′}. (2.33)
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Since ¬S := S ⇒ 0, the expression for negation follows from the above as
(¬S)V = {λ ∈ ΣV | ∀V
′ ⊆ V, Σ(iV ′V )(λ) /∈ SV ′} (2.34)
= {λ ∈ ΣV | ∀V
′ ⊆ V, λ|V ′ /∈ SV ′}. (2.35)
We rewrite the formula for negation as
(¬S)V =
⋂
V ′⊆V
{
λ ∈ ΣV | λ|V ′ ∈ S
c
V ′
}
(2.36)
where SV ′
c denotes the complement of SV ′ in ΣV ′. Clearly, SV ′
c is clopen in ΣV ′ since
SV ′ is clopen. Since the restriction Σ(iV ′V ) : ΣV → ΣV ′ is continuous and surjective
17,
it is easy to see that the inverse image Σ(iV ′V )
−1(SV ′
c) is clopen in ΣV . Clearly,
Σ(iV ′V )
−1(SV ′
c) =
{
λ ∈ ΣV | λ|V ′ ∈ SV ′
c
}
(2.37)
and so, from (2.36) we have
(¬S)V =
⋂
V ′⊆V
Σ(iV ′V )
−1(SV ′
c) (2.38)
The problem is that we want (¬S)V to be a clopen subset of ΣV . Now the right
hand side of (2.38) is the intersection of a family, parameterised by {V ′ | V ′ ⊆ V }, of
clopen sets. Such an intersection is always closed, but it is only guaranteed to be open
if {V ′ | V ′ ⊆ V } is a finite set, which of course may not be the case.
If V ′′ ⊆ V ′ and λ|V ′′ ∈ SV ′′
c, then λ|V ′ ∈ SV ′
c. Indeed, if we had λ|V ′ ∈ SV ′ ,
then (λ|V ′)|V ′′ = λ|V ′′ ∈ SV ′ by the definition of a sub-object, so we would have a
contradiction. This implies Σ(iV ′′V )
−1(SV ′′
c) ⊆ Σ(iV ′V )
−1(SV ′
c), and hence the right
hand side of (2.38) is a decreasing net of clopen subsets of ΣV which converges to
something, which we take as the subset of ΣV that is to be (¬S)V .
Here we have used the fact that the set of clopen subsets of ΣV is a complete lattice,
where the minimum of a family (Ui)i∈I of clopen subsets is defined as the interior of⋂
i∈I Ui. This leads us to define
(¬S)V := int
⋂
V ′⊆V
Σ(iV ′V )
−1(SV ′
c) (2.39)
= int
⋂
V ′⊆V
{
λ ∈ ΣV | λ|V ′ ∈ (SV ′
c)
}
(2.40)
as the negation in Subcl(Σ). This modified definition guarantees that ¬S is a clopen
sub-object. A straightforward extension of this method gives a consistent definition of
S ⇒ T .
This concludes the proof of the theorem.
17See proof of Theorem 3.1 below.
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The important conclusion of this analysis is that Subcl(Σ) is a Heyting algebra. It
is the subset of Sub(Σ) that incorporates the spectral topology on the stalks ΣV , and
the spectral-theory association of projection operators in V with clopen subsets of ΣV .
In particular, the map piqt : PL(S)0 → Subcl(Σ) given by
piqt(Aε∆) := δ
(
Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]
)
(2.41)
can now be extended to all of PL(S) using the ideas discussed in the first paper.
In conclusion: daseinisation can be used to give a representation/model of the
language PL(S) in the Heyting algebra Subcl(Σ).
2.4 Daseinisation and the Operations of Quantum Logic.
It is interesting to ask to what extent, if any, the map δ : P(H) → Subcl(Σ) respects
the lattice structure on P(H). Of course, we know that it cannot be completely pre-
served since the quantum logic P(H) is non-distributive, whereas Subcl(Σ) is a Heyting
algebra, and hence distributive.
We saw in Section 2.1.3 that, for the mapping δ : P(H)→ ΓO, we have
δ(Pˆ ∨ Qˆ)V = δ(Pˆ )V ∨ δ(Qˆ)V , (2.42)
δ(Pˆ ∧ Qˆ)V  δ(Pˆ )V ∧ δ(Qˆ)V (2.43)
for all contexts V in Ob(V(H)).
The clopen subset of ΣV that corresponds to δ(Pˆ )V ∨δ(Qˆ)V is Sδ(Pˆ )V ∪Sδ(Qˆ)V . This
implies that the daseinisation map δ : P(H) → Subcl(Σ) is a morphism of ∨-semi-
lattices.
On the other hand, δ(Pˆ )V ∧ δ(Qˆ)V corresponds to the subset Sδ(Pˆ )V ∩ Sδ(Qˆ)V of
ΣV . Therefore, since Sδ(Pˆ∧Qˆ)V ⊆ Sδ(Pˆ )V ∩ Sδ(Qˆ)V , daseinisation is not a morphism of
∧-semi-lattices. In summary, for all projectors Pˆ , Qˆ we have
δ(Pˆ ∨ Qˆ) = δ(Pˆ ) ∨ δ(Qˆ) (2.44)
δ(Pˆ ∧ Qˆ)  δ(Pˆ ) ∧ δ(Qˆ) (2.45)
where the logical connectives on the left hand side lie in the quantum logic P(H), and
those on the right hand side lie in the Heyting algebra Subcl(Σ), as do the symbols ‘=’
and ‘’.
As remarked above, it is not surprising that (2.45) is not an equality. Indeed,
the quantum logic P(H) is non-distributive, whereas the Heyting algebra Subcl(Σ) is
distributive, and so it would be impossible for both (2.44) and (2.45) to be equalities.
The inequality in (2.45) is the price that must be paid for liberating the projection
operators from the shackles of quantum logic and thrusting them down to the existential
world of Heyting algebras.
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2.4.1 The Status of the Possible Axiom ‘Aε∆1 ∧Aε∆2 ⇔ Aε∆1 ∩∆2’
We have the representation in (2.29), piqt(Aε∆) := δ
(
Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]
)
, of the primitive
propositions Aε∆, and, as explained in our first paper, [1], this can be extended to
compound sentences by making the obvious definitions:
(a) piqt(α ∨ β) := piqt(α) ∨ piqt(β) (2.46)
(b) piqt(α ∧ β) := piqt(α) ∧ piqtβ) (2.47)
(c) piqt(¬α) := ¬piqt(α) (2.48)
(d) piqt(α⇒ β) := piqt(α)⇒ piqt(β) (2.49)
As a result, we necessarily get a representation of the full language PL(S) in the
Heyting algebra Subcl(Σ). However, we then find that:
piqt(Aε∆1 ∧ Aε∆2) := piqt(Aε∆1) ∧ piqt(Aε∆2) (2.50)
= δ(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆1]) ∧ δ(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆2]) (2.51)
 δ(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆1] ∧ Eˆ[A ∈ ∆2]) (2.52)
= δ(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆1 ∩∆2)]) (2.53)
= piqt(Aε∆1 ∩∆2) (2.54)
where, (2.52) comes from (2.45), and in (2.53) we have used the property of spectral
projectors that Eˆ[A ∈ ∆1] ∧ Eˆ[A ∈ ∆2] = Eˆ[A ∈ ∆1 ∩ ∆2)]. Thus, although by
definition, piqt(Aε∆1∧Aε∆2) = piqt(Aε∆1)∧piqt(Aε∆2), we only have the inequality
piqt(Aε∆1 ∩∆2)  piqt(Aε∆1 ∧ Aε∆2) (2.55)
On the other hand, the same line of argument shows that
piqt(Aε∆1 ∨ Aε∆2) = piqt(Aε∆1 ∪∆2) (2.56)
Thus we could consistently add the axiom
Aε∆1 ∨ Aε∆2 ⇔ Aε∆1 ∪∆2 (2.57)
to the language PL(S), but not
Aε∆1 ∧ Aε∆2 ⇔ Aε∆1 ∩∆2 (2.58)
Of, course, both axioms are consistent with the representation of PL(S) in classical
physics.
It should be emphasised that there is nothing wrong with this result: indeed, as
stated above, it is the necessary price to be paid for forcing a non-distributive algebra
to have a ‘representation’ in a Heyting algebra.
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2.4.2 Inner Daseinisation and δ(¬Pˆ ).
In the same spirit, one might ask about “¬(Aε∆)”. By definition, as in (2.49), we
have piqt(¬(Aε∆)) := ¬piqt(Aε∆) = ¬δ
(
Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]
)
. However, the question then is
how, if at all, this is related to δ(Eˆ[A ∈ IR/∆]), bearing in mind the axiom
¬(Aε∆)⇔ Aε IR\∆ (2.59)
that can be added to the classical representation of PL(S). Thus something needs to
be said about δ(¬Pˆ ), where ¬Pˆ = 1ˆ − Pˆ is the negation operation in the quantum
logic P(H).
In order to express δ(¬P ) in terms of δ(Pˆ ), we need to introduce another operation:
Definition 2.6 The inner daseinisation, δi(Pˆ ), of Pˆ is defined for each context V as
δi(Pˆ )V :=
∨{
Qˆ ∈ P(V ) | Qˆ  Pˆ
}
. (2.60)
This should be contrasted with the definition of outer daseinisation in eq. (2.1).
Thus δi(Pˆ )V is the best approximation that can be made to Pˆ by taking the ‘largest’
projector in V that implies Pˆ .
As with the other daseinisation construction, this operation was first introduced
by de Groote in [10] where he called it the core of the projection operator Pˆ . We
prefer to use the phrase ‘inner daseinisation’, and then to refer to (2.1) as the ‘outer
daseinisation’ operation on Pˆ . The existing notation δ(Pˆ )V will be replaced with
δo(Pˆ )V if there is any danger of confusing the two daseinisation operations.
With the aid of inner daseinisation, a new presheaf, I, can be constructed as an
exact analogue of the the outer presheaf, O, defined in Section 2.1.1. Specifically:
Definition 2.7 The inner presheaf I is defined over the category V(H) as follows:
(i) On objects V ∈ Ob(V(H)): We define IV := P(V )
(ii) On morphisms iV ′V : V
′ ⊆ V : The mapping I(iV ′V ) : IV → IV ′ is defined as
I(iV ′V )(αˆ) := δ
i(αˆ)V for all αˆ ∈ P(V ).
It is easy to see that the collection {δi(Pˆ )V | V ∈ Ob(V(H))} of projection operators
given by (2.60) is a global element of I.
It is also straightforward to show that
O(iV ′V )(¬αˆ) = ¬ I(iV ′V )(αˆ) (2.61)
for all projectors αˆ in V , and for all V ′ ⊆ V . It follows from (2.61) that
δo(¬Pˆ )V = 1ˆ− δ
i(Pˆ )V (2.62)
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for all projectors Pˆ and all contexts V .
It is clear from (2.61) that the negation operation on projectors defines a map ¬ :
ΓO → ΓI, γ 7→ ¬γ; i.e., for all contexts V , we map γ(V ) 7→ ¬γ(V ) := 1ˆ−γ(V ). In fact,
one can go further than this and show that there is a natural transformation between
the two presheaves O and I which is an isomorphism in the category SetsV(H)
op
; i.e., O
and I are isomorphic objects in the topos. This isomorphism means that, in principle,
we can always work with one presheaf only. We have elected to use the outer presheaf
O and, as a result, only the outer daseinisation (which we call just ‘daseinisation’)
operation.
3 The Special Nature of Daseinised Projections
3.1 Daseinised Projections as Optimal Sub-Objects
We have shown how daseinisation leads to an interpretation/model of the language
PL(S) in the Heyting algebra Subcl(Σ). The primitive propositions “Aε∆”, i.e., the el-
ements of PL(S)0, are represented by the clopen sub-objects δ(Pˆ ), where Pˆ = Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]
is the spectral projection of Aˆ that corresponds to the Borel set ∆.
We also saw that, in general, the ‘minimum’ δ(Pˆ )∧δ(Qˆ) of two projection operators
Pˆ and Qˆ, is not itself of the form δ(Rˆ) for any projector Rˆ. The same applies to the
negation ¬δ(Pˆ ).
This raises the question of whether the sub-objects of Σ that are of the form δ(Pˆ )
can be characterised in a simple way. Rather interestingly, the answer is ‘yes’ as we
will now see.
Let V ′, V ∈ Ob(V(H)) be such that V ′ ⊆ V . As one might expect, there is a close
connection between the restriction O(iV ′V ) : OV → OV ′, δ(Pˆ )V 7→ δ(Pˆ )V ′, of the outer
presheaf, and the restriction Σ(iV ′V ) : ΣV → ΣV ′ , λ 7→ λ|V ′ , of the spectral presheaf.
Indeed, if Pˆ ∈ P(H) is a projection, and Sδ(Pˆ )V ⊆ ΣV is defined as in (2.23), we have
the following result:
Theorem 3.1
SO(iV ′V )(δ(Pˆ )V ) = Σ(iV
′V )(Sδ(Pˆ )V ). (3.1)
Before proving the theorem, we need a few preparations. For typographical sim-
plicity, for a given pair V ′ ⊆ V we define the map
r : P (ΣV ) → P (ΣV ′)
S 7→ Σ(iV ′V )(S) = {λ|V ′ | λ ∈ S}, (3.2)
where P (ΣV ) is the power set of ΣV . We then have
Lemma 3.2 If δ(Pˆ )V ′ = δ(Pˆ )V , then every λV ′ ∈ Sδ(Pˆ )V ′ is of the form λV |V
′ for
some λV ∈ Sδ(Pˆ )V . This implies r(Sδ(Pˆ )V ) = Sδ(Pˆ )V ′ .
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Proof. If λV ∈ Sδ(Pˆ )V , then λV |V ′ ∈ Sδ(Pˆ )V ′ (since λV |V
′(δ(Pˆ )V ′) = λV |V ′(δ(Pˆ )V ) = 1),
whereas if λV /∈ Sδ(Pˆ )V , then λV |V ′ /∈ Sδ(Pˆ )V ′ (since λV |V
′(δ(Pˆ )V ′) = λV |V ′(δ(Pˆ )V ) = 0).
Since every λV ′ ∈ ΣV ′ is of the form λV |V ′ = r(λV ) for some λV ∈ Sδ(Pˆ )V , the mapping
r : P (ΣV ) → P (ΣV ′) sends Sδ(Pˆ )V to Sδ(Pˆ )V ′ , and the complement (Sδ(Pˆ )V )
c in ΣV is
sent to the complement (Sδ(Pˆ )V ′ )
c in ΣV ′.
Proof. (of Theorem 3.1) By definition, O(iV ′V )
(
δ(Pˆ )V
)
= δ(Pˆ )V ′. The mapping r
defined in (3.2) is open and continuous (which follows from Prop. 3.22 in [11]18).
The map r is also closed. To see this, let C ⊆ ΣV be a closed subset. Since ΣV
is compact, C is compact, and since r is continuous, r(C) ⊆ ΣV ′ is compact, too.
However, ΣV ′ is Hausdorff, and so r(C) is closed in ΣV ′.
Now, Sδ(Pˆ )V is a clopen subset of ΣV , so r(Sδ(Pˆ )V ) is a clopen subset of ΣV ′ . Clearly,
we have
r(Sδ(Pˆ )V ) = int
⋂
{S ⊆ Σ(V ′) | S ∈ CL(Σ(V ′)), r(Sδ(Pˆ )V ) ⊆ S} (3.3)
= int
⋂
{SQˆ ∈ CL(ΣV ′) | r(Sδ(Pˆ )V ) ⊆ SQˆ}. (3.4)
We now show that r(Sδ(Pˆ )V ) ⊆ SQˆ implies Qˆ  δ(Pˆ )V . Assume that Qˆ ≺ δ(Pˆ )V .
Let Rˆ := δ(Pˆ )V−Qˆ ∈ P(V ), and let λ ∈ SRˆ ⊆ ΣV . Then λ ∈ Sδ(Pˆ )V , but λ /∈ SQˆ ⊆ ΣV .
Lemma 3.2 shows that r(SQˆ) = SQˆ (where the former SQˆ is a subset of ΣV and the
latter is a subset of ΣV ′) and r((SQˆ)
c) = (SQˆ)
c. In particular, λ|V ′ /∈ SQˆ ⊆ ΣV ′ , but
λ|V ′ ∈ r(Sδ(Pˆ )V ), so
Qˆ ≺ δ(Pˆ )V ⇒ r(Sδ(Pˆ )V ) * SQˆ. (3.5)
Hence we must have Qˆ  δ(Pˆ )V , from which we obtain
r(Sδ(Pˆ )V ) = int
⋂
{SQˆ ∈ CL(ΣV ′) | Qˆ  δ(Pˆ )V }. (3.6)
We now use the lattice isomorphism between CL(ΣV ′) and P(V
′) (see (2.24)) to get
r(Sδ(Pˆ )V ) = int
⋂
{SQˆ ∈ CL(ΣV ′) | Qˆ  δ(Pˆ )V }
= S{Qˆ∈P(V ′)|Qˆδ(Pˆ )V } = SO(iV ′V )(δ(Pˆ )V ). (3.7)
This completes the proof of the theorem.
This result shows that the sub-objects δ(Pˆ ) = {Sδ(Pˆ )V | V ∈ Ob(V(H))} of Σ are
of a very special kind. Namely, they are such that the restriction
Σ(iV ′V ) : Sδ(Pˆ )V → Sδ(Pˆ )V ′ (3.8)
18The von Neumann algebra V corresponds to the algebra R in de Groote’s (more general) proof,
V ′ corresponds to A. Our mapping r is his ζA. For abelian von Neumann algebras, quasipoints
can be identified with elements of the Gel’fand spectrum, and the topologies on the space Q(V ) of
quasipoints and the Gel’fand spectrum ΣV coincide. For all this, see [11], in particular, Thm. 3.2.
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is a surjective mapping of sets.
For an arbitrary sub-object K of Σ, this will generally not be the case and Σ(iV ′V )
will only mapKV into KV ′ . Indeed, this is essentially the definition of a sub-object of a
presheaf. Thus we see that the daseinised projections Sδ(Pˆ ) = {Sδ(Pˆ )V | V ∈ Ob(V(H))}
are optimal in the following sense. As we go ‘down the line’ to smaller and smaller
subalgebras of a context V—for example, from V to V ′ ⊆ V , then to V ′′ ⊆ V ′ etc.—
then the subsets Sδ(Pˆ )V ′ , Sδ(Pˆ )V ′′ ,... are as small as they can be; i.e., Sδ(Pˆ )V ′ is the
smallest subset of ΣV ′ such that Σ(iV ′V )(Sδ(Pˆ )V ) ⊆ Sδ(Pˆ )V ′ , likewise Sδ(Pˆ )V ′′ is the
smallest subset of ΣV ′′ such that Σ(iV ′′V ′)(Sδ(Pˆ )V ′ ) ⊆ Sδ(Pˆ )V ′′ , and so on.
It is also clear from this result that there are sub-objects of Σ that are not of the
form δ(Pˆ ) for any projector Pˆ ∈ P(H).
These more general sub-objects of Σ show up explicitly in the representation of the
more sophisticated language L(S). This subject will be discussed in the next paper,
III, in this series. There we analyse the representation, φ, of the language L(S) in
the topos SetsV(H)
op
. This involves constructing the quantity-value object Rφ (to be
denoted R), and then finding the representation of a function symbol A : Σ→ R, from
L(S), in the form of a specific arrow A˘ : Σ→R in the topos. The generic sub-objects
of Σ are then of the form A˘−1(Ξ) for sub-objects Ξ of R. This is an illuminating way
of studying the sub-objects of Σ that do not come from the propositional language
PL(S).
4 Truth Values in Topos Physics
4.1 The Mathematical Proposition “x ∈ K”
So far we have concentrated on finding a Heyting-algebra representation of the propo-
sitions in quantum theory, but of course there is more to physics than that. We also
want to know if a certain proposition is true: a question which, in physical theories,
can only be answered by specifying a state of the system, or something that can play
an analogous role.
In classical physics, the situation is straightforward. There, a proposition “Aε∆”
is represented by the subset19 picl(Aε∆) := A˘
−1(∆) ⊆ S of the state space S; and then,
the proposition is true in a state s if and only if s ∈ A˘−1(∆); i.e., if and only if the
(micro-) state s belongs to the subset, picl(Aε∆), of S that represents the proposition.
Thus, each state s assigns to any primitive proposition “Aε∆”, a truth value,
ν
(
Aε∆; s
)
, which lies in the set {false, true} (which we identify with {0, 1}) and is
defined as
ν
(
Aε∆; s
)
:=
{
1 if s ∈ picl(Aε∆) := A˘
−1(∆);
0 otherwise.
(4.1)
19Here, A˘ : S → IR is the mathematical representation of the physical quantity A.
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for all s ∈ S.
However, the situation is very different for quantum theory. This is because the
spectral presheaf Σ, which is the analogue of the classical state space S, has no global
elements at all. And no doubt there will be other topos theories of physics where ΓΣφ is
empty; or, if Σφ does have global elements, there are not enough of them to determine
Σφ as an object in the topos. In this circumstance, a new concept is required to replace
the familiar idea of a ‘state of the system’.
In physics, the propositions of interest are of the form “Aε∆”, which refer to the
value of a physical quantity. However, in constructing a theory of physics, physical
propositions are invariably first translated into mathematical propositions; the concept
of ‘truth’ is then studied in the context of the latter.
Let us start with set-theory based mathematics, where the most basic proposition
is of the form “x ∈ K”, where K is a subset of a set X, and x is an element of X.
Then the truth value, denoted ν( x ∈ K ), of the proposition “x ∈ K” is
ν( x ∈ K ) =
{
1 if x belongs to K;
0 otherwise.
(4.2)
Thus the proposition “x ∈ K” is true if, and only if, x belongs to K; i.e., if, and only
if, x ∈ K.
This result sounds like a tautology but, nevertheless, it is the foundation of the
assignment of truth values in physics. For example, in classical physics, if the state
is s, the truth value, ν
(
Aε∆; s
)
, of the physical proposition “Aε∆” is defined to be
the truth value of the mathematical proposition “A˘(s) ∈ ∆”; or, equivalently, of the
mathematical proposition “s ∈ A˘−1(∆)”.
Thus, using (4.2), we get, for all s ∈ S,
ν
(
Aε∆; s
)
:=
{
1 if s ∈ A˘−1(∆);
0 otherwise.
(4.3)
which reproduces (4.1). We now consider the analogue of the above in a general topos
τ .
Let X be an object in the topos τ , and let K be a sub-object of X. Then K
is determined by a characteristic arrow χK : X → Ωτ , where Ωτ is the sub-object
classifier for the topos; equivalently we have an arrow pKq : 1τ → PX.
Now suppose that20 pxq : 1τ → X is a global element of X; i.e., x ∈ ΓX. Then the
truth value of the mathematical proposition “x ∈ K” is defined to be
ν( x ∈ K ) := χK ◦ pxq (4.4)
20One of the basic properties of a topos is that there is a one-to-one correspondence between arrows
f : A×B → Ω and arrows pfq : A→ PB := ΩB. In general, pfq is called the power transpose of f .
If A ≃ 1 then pfq is known as the name of the arrow f : B → Ω. On exponentials, see the Appendix
in paper I.
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where χK ◦ pxq : 1τ → Ωτ . Thus ν( x ∈ K ) is an element of ΓΩτ ; i.e., it is a global
element of the sub-object classifier Ωτ .
The relation with the result (4.2) (in the topos Sets) can be seen by noting that, in
(4.2), the characteristic function of the subset K ⊆ X is the function χK : X → {0, 1}
such that χK(x) = 1 if x ∈ K, and χK(x) = 0 otherwise. It follows that (4.2) can be
rewritten as
ν( x ∈ K ) = χK(x)
= χK ◦ pxq (4.5)
where, in (4.5), pxq is the function pxq : {∗} → X that is defined by pxq(∗) := x.
The link with (4.4) is clear when one remembers that, in the topos Sets, the terminal
object, 1Sets, is just the singleton set {∗}.
In quantum theory, the topos is SetsV(H)
op
, and so the objects are all presheaves.
In particular, at each stage V , the sub-object classifier Ω := Ω
Sets
V(H)op is the set of
sieves on V . In this case, if K is a sub-object of X, and x ∈ ΓX, the explicit form for
(4.5) is the sieve
ν( x ∈ K )V := {V
′ ⊆ V | xV ′ ∈ KV ′} (4.6)
at each stage V ∈ Ob(V(H)).
The definitions (4.4) and (4.6) play a central role in constructing truth values in our
scheme. However, as Σ has no global elements, these truth values cannot be derived
from an expression ν( s ∈ K ) with psq : 1
Sets
V(H)op → Σ. Therefore, we must proceed
in a different way, as will become clear by the end of the following Section.
4.2 Truth Objects
4.2.1 Linguistic Aspects of Truth Objects.
To understand the construction of ‘truth values’ in a topos we return again to the
discussion in paper I of local languages [1]. In this Section we will employ the local
language L(S), rather than the propositional language, PL(S), used earlier in this
paper.
Thus, let L(S) be the local language for a system S. As explained in paper I, this
is a typed language whose minimal set of ground-type symbols is Σ and R. There is
a non-empty set, FL(S)
(
Σ,R
)
, of function symbols A : Σ→ R that correspond to the
physical quantities of S.
Now consider a representation, φ, of L(S) in a topos τφ. As discussed in paper I,
the propositional aspects of the language L(S) are captured in the term ‘A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜’ of
type Ω, where s˜ and ∆˜ are variables of type Σ and PR respectively [1]. In a topos
representation, φ, the representation, [[A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜ ]]φ, of the term ‘A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜’ is given by
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the chain of arrows21[5]
Σφ × PRφ
Aφ×id
−→Rφ × PRφ
eRφ
−→Ωτφ (4.7)
in the topos τφ. Then, if pΞq : 1τφ → PRφ is a sub-object of the quantity-value object
Rφ, we get the chain
Σφ ≃ Σφ × 1τφ
id×pΞq
−→Σφ × PRφ
Aφ×id
−→Rφ × PRφ
eRφ
−→Ωτφ . (4.8)
which is interpreted as the characteristic arrow associated with the proposition “AεΞ”.
Equivalently, we can use the term, {s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜}, which has a free variable ∆˜ of
type PR and is of type PΣ (see paper I, [1]). This term is represented by the arrow
[[ {s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜} ]]φ : PRφ → PΣφ, which is the power transpose of [[A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜ ]]φ:
[[ {s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜} ]]φ = p[[A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜ ]]φq (4.9)
The proposition “AεΞ” is then represented by the arrow [[ {s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜} ]]φ ◦ pΞq :
1τφ → PRφ.
We note an important difference with the analogous situation for the language
PL(S). In propositions of the type “Aε∆”, the symbol ‘∆’ is external to the language
(it is a specific subset of IR), and it is independent of the representation of PL(S).
However, in the case of L(S), the variable ∆˜ is internal to the language, and the quan-
tity Ξ in the proposition “AεΞ” is a sub-object ofRφ in a specific topos representation,
φ, of L(S).
This is how physical propositions are represented mathematically. But how are
truth values to be assigned to these propositions? In the topos τφ a truth value is an
element of the Heyting algebra ΓΩτφ . Thus the challenge is to assign a global element of
Ωτφ to each proposition associated with the representation of the term {s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜}
of type PΣ; (or, equivalently, the representation of the term ‘A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜’).
Let us first pose this question at a linguistic level. In a representation φ, an element
of ΓΩτφ is associated with a representation of a term of type Ω with no free variables.
Hence the question can be rephrased as asking how a term, t, in L(S) of type PΣ can
be ‘converted’ into a term of type Ω? At this stage, we are happy to have free variables
in this term, in which case it will be represented by an arrow in τφ with co-domain
Ωτφ , but whose domain is other than 1τφ. This is an intermediate stage to obtaining a
global element of Ωτφ .
In the context of the language L(S) there are two obvious ways of ‘converting’ the
term t of type PΣ to a term of type Ω:
1. Choose a term, s, of type Σ; then the term ‘s ∈ t’ is of type Ω.
2. Choose a term, T, of type PPΣ; then the term ‘t ∈ T’ is of type Ω.
21In (4.7), eRφ : Rφ × PRφ → Ωτφ is the evaluation arrow associated with the power object PRφ.
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In regard to the first option, the simplest term of type Σ is a variable s˜1 of type Σ.
Then, the term ‘s˜1 ∈ {s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜}’ is of type Ω with the free variables s˜1 of type Σ
and ∆˜ of type PR. However, the axiom of comprehension in L(S) says that
s˜1 ∈ {s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜} ⇔ A(s˜1) ∈ ∆˜ (4.10)
and so we are back with the term ‘A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜’, which is of type Ω and with the free
variable s˜ of type Σ.
As stated above, the φ-representation, [[A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜ ]]φ, of ‘A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜’ is the chain of
arrows in (4.7). Now, if the representation, φ, is such that there exist global elements,
psq : 1τφ → Σφ, of Σφ, then each such element can be regarded as a ‘(micro)-state’ of
the system. This can be combined with the arrow [[A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜ ]]φ : Σφ × PRφ → Ωτφ to
give the arrow
[[A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜ ]]φ ◦ (psq× id) : 1τφ × PRφ → Σφ × PRφ → Ωτφ (4.11)
Finally, if pΞq : 1τφ → PRφ is a sub-object of the quantity-value object Rφ, then
[[A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜ ]]φ ◦ (psq× id) ◦ pΞq : 1τφ → Ωτφ (4.12)
is the desired global element of Ωτφ . To simplify the notation somewhat, we will rewrite
(4.12) as
[[A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜ ]]φ〈psq, pΞq〉 : 1τφ → Ωτφ (4.13)
Thus, 〈psq, pΞq〉 : 1τφ → Σφ × PRφ.
In other words, when the ‘state of the system’ is s ∈ ΓΣφ, the ‘truth value’ of the
proposition “AεΞ”—as represented by the sub-object of Σφ with characteristic arrow
[[A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜ ]]φ ◦ (id ◦ pΞq) : Σφ × 1 → Ωτφ—is the global element of Ωτφ defined by
[[A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜ ]]φ〈psq, pΞq〉 : 1τφ → Ωτφ . All this may seem rather complicated but, in
fact, it is quite straightforward once one gets used to the notation.
This is the procedure that is adopted in classical physics, where a truth value is
assigned to propositions by specifying a micro-state, s ∈ Σσ, where Σσ is the classical
state space in the representation σ of L(S). Specifically, for all s ∈ Σσ, the truth value
of the proposition “Aε∆” as given by (4.13), is (c.f. (4.1))
ν
(
Aε∆; s
)
= [[A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜ ]]σ(s,∆) =
{
1 if Aσ(s) ∈ ∆;
0 otherwise.
(4.14)
where [[A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜ ]]σ : Σσ × P IR → Ωτσ ≃ {0, 1}. Thus we recover the earlier result
(4.3).
4.2.2 Truth Objects in a General Topos.
By hindsight, we know that the option to use global elements of Σφ is not available
in the quantum case. There, the state object, Σ, is the spectral presheaf, and this
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has no global elements by virtue of the Kochen-Specker theorem. The absence of
global elements of the state object Σφ could well be true in many other topos models
of physics, and therefore an alternative general strategy is needed to that employing
micro-states psq : 1τφ → Σφ.
This takes us to the second possibility: namely, to introduce a term, T, of type
PPΣ, and then work with the term ‘{s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜} ∈ T’, which is of type Ω, and has
whatever free variables are contained in T, plus the variable ∆˜ of type PR.
The simplest choice is to let the term of type PPΣ be a variable, T˜, of type
PPΣ, in which case the term ‘{s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜} ∈ T˜’ has variables ∆˜ of type PR and
T˜ of type PPΣ. Therefore, in a topos representation it is represented by an arrow
[[ {s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜} ∈ T˜ ]]φ : PRφ × P (PΣφ)→ Ωτφ . In detail (see [5]) we have that
[[ {s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜} ∈ T˜ ]]φ = ePΣφ ◦ 〈[[ {s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜} ]]φ, [[ T˜ ]]φ〉 (4.15)
where ePΣφ : PΣφ × P (PΣφ) → Ωτφ is the usual evaluation arrow. In using this
expression we need the φ-representatives:
[[ {s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜} ]]φ : PRφ → PΣφ (4.16)
[[ T˜ ]]φ : P (PΣφ)
id
−→ P (PΣφ) (4.17)
Finally, let 〈pΞq, pTq〉 be a pair of global elements in PRφ and P (PΣφ) respectively,
so that pΞq : 1τφ → PRφ and pTq : 1τφ → P (PΣφ). Thus, pTq is a concrete truth
object in τφ. Then, for the physical proposition “AεΞ”, we have the truth value
ν
(
AεΞ;T
)
= [[ {s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜} ∈ T˜ ]]φ〈pΞq, pTq〉 : 1τφ → Ωτφ (4.18)
A small generalisation. More generally, if K˜ and T˜ are variables of type PΣ and
P (PΣ) respectively, the term of interest is ‘K˜ ∈ T˜’. In the representation, φ, of L(S),
this term maps to an arrow [[ K˜ ∈ T˜ ]]φ : PΣφ × P (PΣφ)→ Ωτφ . Here,
[[ K˜ ∈ T˜ ]]φ = ePΣφ ◦ 〈[[ K˜ ]]φ, [[ T˜ ]]φ〉 (4.19)
where
[[ K˜ ]]φ : PΣφ
id
−→ PΣφ (4.20)
[[ T˜ ]]φ : P (PΣφ)
id
−→ P (PΣφ) (4.21)
Let pKq, pTq be global elements of PΣφ and P (PΣφ) respectively, so that pKq :
1τφ → PΣφ and pTq : 1τφ → P (PΣφ). We adopt the notation 〈pKq, pTq〉 : 1τφ →
PΣφ × P (PΣφ). Then the truth of the (mathematical) proposition “pKq ∈ T” is
ν( pKq ∈ T ) = [[ K˜ ∈ T˜ ]]φ 〈pKq, pTq〉
= ePΣφ ◦ 〈pKq, pTq〉 : 1τφ → Ωτφ (4.22)
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4.2.3 The Example of Classical Physics.
If classical physics is studied this way, the general formalism simplifies, and the term
‘{s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜} ∈ T˜’ is represented by the function [[ {s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜} ∈ T˜ ]]σ :
P IR× P (PΣσ)→ ΩSets ≃ {0, 1} defined by
ν
(
Aε∆;T
)
= [[ {s˜ | A(s˜) ∈ ∆˜} ∈ T˜ ]]σ(∆,T) =
{
1 if {s ∈ Σσ | Aσ(s) ∈ ∆} ∈ T;
0 otherwise
=
{
1 if A−1σ (∆) ∈ T;
0 otherwise
(4.23)
for all T ∈ P (PΣσ). We can clearly see the sense in which the truth object T is playing
the role of a state. Note that the result (4.23) of classical physics is a special case of
(4.18).
To recover the usual truth values given in (4.14), a truth object, Ts, must be
associated with each micro-state s ∈ Σσ. The correct choice is
Ts := {K ⊆ Σσ | s ∈ K} (4.24)
for each s ∈ Σσ. It is clear that s ∈ A
−1
σ (∆) (or, equivalently, Aσ(s) ∈ ∆) if, and only
if, A−1σ (∆) ∈ T
s. Hence (4.23) can be rewritten as
ν
(
Aε∆;Ts
)
:=
{
1 if s ∈ A−1σ (∆);
0 otherwise.
(4.25)
which reproduces (4.14) once ν
(
Aε∆; s
)
is identified with ν
(
Aε∆;Ts
)
.
4.2.4 The Truth Object T |ψ〉 in Quantum Theory
We can now start to discuss the application of these ideas to quantum theory. In order
to use (4.22) or (4.18) we need to construct a concrete truth object, pTq, in the topos
τφ := Sets
V(H)op . Thus pTq : 1τφ → P (PΣ); equivalently, T is a sub-object of PΣ.
However, we have to keep in mind the need to restrict to clopen sub-objects of Σ.
In particular, we have to show that there is a well-defined presheaf PclΣ such that
Subcl(Σ) ≃ Γ(PclΣ) (4.26)
We will prove this shortly in Section 4.3.
Given (4.26), K ∈ Subcl(Σ) is equivalent to an arrow pKq : 1τφ → PclΣ; and hence a
truth object, T, has to be a sub-object of PclΣ in order that the valuation ν( pKq ∈ T )
in (4.22) is meaningful.
This truth value, ν( pKq ∈ T ), is a global element of Ω, and in the topos of
presheaves, SetsV(H)
op
, we have (see (4.6))
ν( pKq ∈ T )V := {V
′ ⊆ V | KV ′ ∈ TV ′} (4.27)
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for each context V .
There are various examples of K that are of interest to us. In particular, let K =
δ(Pˆ ) for some projector Pˆ . Then, using the propositional language PL(S) discussed
earlier in this paper, the ‘truth’ of the proposition represented by Pˆ (for example,
“Aε∆”) is
ν( pδ(Pˆ )q ∈ T )V = {V
′ ⊆ V | δ(Pˆ )V ′
)
∈ TV ′} (4.28)
for all stages V .
In the case of the local language L(S), the important example is when the sub-
object K of Σ is of the form A−1φ (Ξ), for some sub-object Ξ of R . This will yield
the truth value, ν
(
AεΞ;T
)
, in (4.18). However, to discuss this further requires the
representation of function symbols A : Σ → R in the topos SetsV(H)
op
, and this is
deferred until paper III [2].
The definition of the truth objects T |ψ〉. The definition of truth objects in quan-
tum theory was studied in the original papers [13, 14, 15, 16]. It was shown there
that to each quantum state |ψ〉 ∈ H, there corresponds a truth object, T |ψ〉, which is
defined as the following sub-object of the outer presheaf, O:
T |ψ〉V := {αˆ ∈ OV | Prob(αˆ; |ψ〉) = 1}
= {αˆ ∈ OV | 〈ψ| αˆ |ψ〉 = 1} (4.29)
for all stages V ∈ Ob(V(H)). Here, Prob(αˆ; |ψ〉) is the usual expression for the prob-
ability that the proposition represented by the projector αˆ is true, given that the
quantum state is the (normalised) vector |ψ〉.
It is easy to see that (4.29) defines a genuine sub-object T |ψ〉 = {T |ψ〉V | V ∈
Ob(V(H))} of O, since if βˆ  αˆ, then 〈ψ| βˆ |ψ〉 ≥ 〈ψ| αˆ |ψ〉. Therefore, if V ′ ⊆ V
and αˆ ∈ OV , then 〈ψ|O(iV ′V )(αˆ) |ψ〉 ≥ 〈ψ| αˆ |ψ〉. In particular, if 〈ψ| αˆ |ψ〉 = 1 then
〈ψ|O(iV ′V )(αˆ) |ψ〉 = 1.
We note that there is an interesting connection between T |ψ〉 and (outer) daseini-
sation. Specifically, at each stage V , take the smallest projection αˆ0(V ) in T
|ψ〉
V . Then,
clearly, since 〈ψ| αˆ |ψ〉 = 1 just means αˆ  ˆP |ψ〉, we have
αˆ0(V ) = δ(Pˆ |ψ〉)V , (4.30)
where Pˆ |ψ〉 is the projection onto the one-dimensional subspace generated by |ψ〉.
The next step is to define the presheaf PclΣ, and then show that there is a monic
arrow O → PclΣ, so that O is a sub-object of PclΣ. Then, since T
|ψ〉 is a sub-object
of O, and O is a sub-object of PclΣ, it follows that T
|ψ〉 is a sub-object of PclΣ, as
required.
With this definition of T |ψ〉, the truth value, (4.28), for the propositional language
PL(S) becomes
ν( pδ(Pˆ )q ∈ T |ψ〉 )V = {V
′ ⊆ V | 〈ψ| δ(Pˆ )V ′ |ψ〉 = 1} (4.31)
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It is easy to see that the definition of a truth object in (4.29) can be extended to
a mixed state with a density-matrix operator ρˆ: simply replace the definition in (4.29)
with
TρˆV := {αˆ ∈ OV | Prob(αˆ; ρ) = 1}
= {αˆ ∈ OV | tr(ρˆαˆ) = 1} (4.32)
However there is an important difference between the truth object associated with a
vector state, |ψ〉, and the one associated with a density matrix, ρ. In the vector case, it
is easy to see that the mapping |ψ〉 → T |ψ〉 is one-to-one (up to a phase factor on |ψ〉)
so that, in principle, the state |ψ〉 can be recovered from T |ψ〉 (up to a phase-factor).
On the other hand, there are simple counterexamples which show that, in general, the
density matrix, ρ cannot be recovered from Tρˆ.
In a sense, this should not surprise us. The analogue of a density matrix in classical
physics is a probability measure µ defined on the classical state space S. Individual
microstates s ∈ S are in one-to-one correspondence with probability measures of the
form µs defined by µs(K) = 1 if s ∈ K, µs(K) = 0 if s 6∈ K.
However, one of the main claims of our programme is that any theory ‘looks like’
classical physics in the appropriate topos. This suggests that, in the topos version of
quantum theory, a density matrix should be represented by some sort of measure on
the state object Σ in the topos τφ; and this should relate in some way to an ‘integral’
of ‘vector truth objects’. The development of this idea is one of the many interesting
tasks for the future.
4.2.5 Time-dependence and the Truth Object.
As emphasised at the end of the first paper in this series [1], the question of time de-
pendence depends on the theory-type being considered. The structure of the language
L(S) that has been used so far is such that the time variable lies outside the language.
In this situation, the time dependence of the system can be implemented in several
ways.
For example, we can make the truth object time dependent, giving a family of truth
objects, t 7→ Tt, t ∈ IR. In the case of classical physics, with the truth objects Ts,
s ∈ Σσ, the time evolution comes from the time dependence, t 7→ st, of the microstate
in accordance with the classical equations of motion. This gives the family t 7→ Tst of
truth objects.
Something similar happens in quantum theory, with a family t 7→ T |ψ〉t of truth
objects, where the states |ψ〉t satisfy the time-dependent Schro¨dinger equation. Thus
both classical and quantum truth objects belong to a ‘Scho¨dinger picture’ of time
evolution.
It is also possible to construct a ‘Heisenberg picture’ where the truth object is
constant but the physical quantities and associated propositions are time dependent.
We will return to this in the next paper when we discuss the use of unitary operators.
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4.3 The Presheaf PclΣ
4.3.1 The Definition of PclΣ.
We must now show that there really is a presheaf PclΣ.
The easiest way of defining PclΣ is to start with the concrete expression for the
normal power object PΣ [6]. First, if F is any presheaf over V(H), define the restriction
of F to V to be the functor F ↓V from the category22 ↓V to Sets that assigns to each
V1 ⊆ V , the set F V1 , and with the obvious induced presheaf maps.
Then, at each stage V , PΣV is the set of natural transformations from Σ ↓ V to
Ω↓V . These are in one-to-one correspondence with families of maps σ := {σV1 : ΣV1 →
ΩV1 | V1 ⊆ V }, with the following commutative diagram for all V2 ⊆ V1 ⊆ V :
ΣV2 ΩV2
-
σV2
ΣV1 ΩV1
-
σV1
?
Σ(iV1V2)
?
Ω(iV1V2)
The presheaf maps are defined by
PΣ(iV1V ) : PΣV → PΣV1 (4.33)
σ 7→ {σV2 | V2 ⊆ V1} (4.34)
and the evaluation arrow ev : PΣ× Σ→ Ω, has the form, at each stage V :
evV : PΣV × ΣV → ΩV (4.35)
(σ, λ) 7→ σV (λ) (4.36)
Moreover, in general, given a map χ : ΣV → ΩV , the subset of ΣV associated with
the corresponding sub-object is χ−1(1), where 1 is the unit (‘truth’) in the Heyting
algebra ΩV .
This suggests strongly that an object, PclΣ, in Sets
V(H)op can be defined using the
same definition of PΣ as above, except that the family of maps σ := {σV1 : ΣV1 →
ΩV1 | V1 ⊆ V } must be such that, for all V1 ⊆ V , σ
−1
V1
(1) is a clopen subset of the
(extremely disconnected) Hausdorff space ΣV1 . It is straightforward to check that such
a restriction is consistent, and that Subcl(Σ) ≃ Γ(PclΣ) as required.
4.3.2 The Monic Arrow From O to PclΣ.
We define ι : O × Σ → Ω, with the power transpose pιq : O → PclΣ, as follows. First
recall that in any topos, τ there is a bijection Homτ (A,C
B) ≃ Homτ (A × B,C), and
22The notation ↓V means the partially-ordered set of all subalgebras V ′ ⊆ V .
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hence, in particular, (using PΣ = ΩΣ)
Hom
Sets
V(H)op (O,PΣ) ≃ Hom
Sets
V(H)op (O × Σ,Ω). (4.37)
Now let αˆ ∈ P(V ), and let Sαˆ := {λ ∈ ΣV | λ(αˆ) = 1} be the clopen subset of
ΣV that corresponds to the projector αˆ via the spectral theorem; see (2.23). Then we
define ι : O × Σ→ Ω at stage V by
ιV (αˆ, λ) := {V
′ ⊆ V | Σ(iV ′ V )(λ) ∈ SO(iV ′ V )(αˆ)} (4.38)
for all (αˆ, λ) ∈ OV × ΣV .
On the other hand, the basic result relating coarse-graining to subsets of Σ is
SO(iV ′ V )(δ(αˆ)V ) = Σ(iV ′ V )(Sδ(αˆ)V ) (4.39)
for all V ′ ⊆ V and for all αˆ ∈ OV . It follows that
ιV (αˆ, λ) := {V
′ ⊆ V | Σ(iV ′ V )(λ) ∈ Σ(iV ′ V )(Sαˆ)} (4.40)
for all (αˆ, λ) ∈ OV × ΣV . In this form is is clear that ιV (αˆ, λ) is indeed a sieve on V ;
i.e., an element of ΩV .
The next step is to show that the collection of maps ιV : OV × ΣV → ΩV defined
in (4.38) constitutes a natural transformation from the object O × Σ to the object Ω
in the topos SetsV(H)
op
. This involves chasing around a few commutative squares, and
we will spare the reader the ordeal. There is some subtlety, since we really want to
deal with Hom
Sets
V(H)op (O,PclΣ), not HomSetsV(H)op (O,PΣ); but all works in the end.
To prove that pιq : O → PclΣ is monic, it suffices to show that the map pιqV :
OV → PclΣV is injective at all stages V . This is a straightforward exercise and the
details will not be given here.
The conclusion of this exercise is that, since pιq : O → PclΣ is monic, the truth
sub-objects T |ψ〉 of O can also be regarded as sub-objects of PclΣ, and hence the truth
value assignment in (4.28) is well-defined.
Finally then, for any given quantum state |ψ〉 the basic proposition “Aε∆” can be
assigned a generalised truth value ν
(
Aε∆; |ψ〉
)
in ΓΩ, where τ := SetsV(H)
op
is the
topos of presheaves over V(H). This is defined at each stage/context V as
ν
(
Aε∆; |ψ〉
)
V
:= ν( pδ(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆])q ∈ T |ψ〉 )V
= {V ′ ⊆ V | pδ
(
Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]
)
qV ′ ∈ T
|ψ〉
V ′ }. (4.41)
5 Conclusion
In this, the second in our series of papers on topos theory and physics, we have started
the development of a topos representation of quantum theory. In the first half of the
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paper, we have shown how propositions can be represented by clopen sub-objects of
the spectral presheaf, Σ, of the quantum theory. This is equivalent to finding a topos
representation of the propositional language, PL(S), that was discussed in paper I
[1]. A key ingredient in this representation is the concept of daseinisation, due to de
Groote. By using this operation, a projection operator Eˆ[A ∈ ∆] can be mapped to
a global element δ(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]) of the outer presheaf O, and, with the aid of the monic
O → PclΣ, thereby to a (clopen) sub-object of the state object Σ.
As was emphasised in the Introduction, this piece of work is something of a sideline
in regard to the main programme, which is to find representations of the local language
L(S). However, it is a satisfying (for us) completion of the earlier work on quantum
theory and topoi.
But it is also a useful example with which to discuss the general problem of what
lies ‘inside’ a language, and what lies ‘outside’. In the case of the language PL(S), it is
clear that most ‘symbols’ in the theory lie outside. This includes (i) the topos; (ii) the
physical quantities, A, and subsets, ∆ ⊆ IR, in the primitive propositions “Aε∆”; and
(iii) the state object whose sub-objects provide the Heyting algebra in which PL(S) is
represented.
On the other hand, in a representation of the language L(S), the only entity that
necessarily lies outside the scope of the language, is the topos in which it is represented.
As we will see in the next paper, III, the most general propositions in the L(S)-theory
are represented by the sub-objects A−1φ (Ξ), where Ξ is any sub-object of the quantity-
value object Rφ [2]. In this form, all the important physical ingredients in the theory
have linguistic precursors in the language L(S) (with the exception of the topos τφ).
It is this ‘internal’ language that would be used to manipulate propositions ‘about the
world’ in a theory of this type.
The second part of the present paper is concerned with the idea of ‘truth objects’.
These play a central role in both the PL(S) and the L(S)-representations, and are
the closest analogue there is to the notion of a micro-state in classical physics. It is
likely that most topos-based theories of physics will use these objects because of the
anticipated absence of microstates; classical physics is, of course, an exception.
The discussion of truth objects in Section 4.2 was formulated in terms of the lan-
guage L(S), which gives a clear way of understanding the two types of ‘state’: mi-
crostates (global elements of the state object Σφ), and truth objects (global elements
of the power object P (PΣφ)). However, the actual quantum-theory truth objects used
in Section 4.2 are the ones given in the original papers on toposifying quantum theory,
and no work has been done on them since then.
This is clearly an area in which further research is necessary. In particular, we
would like to know if there are any generic properties of a truth object as an element
in P (PΣφ); i.e., is there a theory of such things, or can any element of P (PΣφ) serve
as one? This is related to a question that arises naturally when considering the specific
truth objects, T |ψ〉, in quantum theory: namely what, if anything, can be said about
the object Tα |ψ〉+β |φ〉 in regard to the objects T |ψ〉 and T |φ〉? Or, to put it another way,
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is there an analogue for truth objects of the superposition of states? This is a very
important subject for future research.
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